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Australian Approaches to International 
Environmental Law during the Howard Years 
Gregory Rose∗ 
I. Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of major Australian developments in international 
environmental law during the term of the Howard government. It argues that 
Australian approaches to the field of international environmental law under the 
Howard government were primarily characterised by emphasis on sovereign rights, 
shared global responsibility, market forces and compliance. The emphasis on 
sovereign rights refers to the Howard government’s robust assertion of Australian 
autonomous and effective sovereign control over the use of its claimed natural 
resources. International law establishes and recognises sovereign states’ rights to 
develop and to manage the natural resources within their respective jurisdictions.1 
The emphasis on shared global responsibility refers to the government’s approach 
to participation with other states in the development of international and regional 
regimes for management of the shared environment or coordination with other 
countries to combat common environmental problems. The government’s approach 
posed a major challenge to some understandings of the international environmental 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, which distinguishes 
between the obligations of developed and developing countries in combating 
common global environmental problems by imposing heavier responsibilities upon 
developed countries.2 The emphasis on market forces meant that the government 
resisted the development of environmental regimes that would utilise trade-
restrictive mechanisms that interfere with the free play of the marketplace, although 
                                                          
∗ Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. The author is grateful 
for helpful comments provided by Dr Warwick Gullett. 
1  United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Annex I, 
3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I), Principle 2: ‘States have, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international 
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ 
2  Ibid Principle 7: ‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility 
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command.’ 
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it supported the design of environmental regimes that would harness market 
forces. 3  Finally, in relation to the emphasis on compliance, the Howard 
government’s approach demonstrated a commitment to the implementation and 
domestic enforcement of Australia’s international legal obligations. This is 
consistent with a contemporary global emphasis in international environmental law 
that urges stronger domestic implementation, recognising that, although there is a 
plethora of new international environmental treaties, they typically suffer from 
poor compliance.4  
Each of the approaches argued as characterising the Howard government can be 
contraindicated in some instances. For example, despite the trend toward stronger 
compliance systems, there are weaknesses in several compliance review processes. 
Such qualifications do not negate the arguments made here. The emphasis on 
sovereign rights, shared responsibility, market forces and compliance were 
dominant, not exclusive or absolute, tendencies in the Howard government’s 
approaches to international law in the field of environment and natural resources.  
As a further qualifier, it would be misleading to refer to the ‘Howard 
government approach’ as distinct or unique. There is a great deal of continuity 
between governments and the Howard government’s policies continued many of 
those of the previous Keating government. For example, the Howard government 
continued the Keating government’s approach to climate change negotiations. 
Thus, the differences are typically of degree and therefore the Howard 
government’s policies are characterised in terms of changes in emphasis, rather 
than direction.  
The Howard government placed more weight on domestic economic and 
electoral concerns than on perceptions of international environmental citizenship 
when it assessed Australia’s interests in the international politics of the 
environment. Each treaty action undertaken by the government, that is, the 
ratification of or accession to a treaty or an amendment, was subject to a newly 
introduced national impact analysis (NIA) prepared by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and considered in Parliament by the Joint Standing Committee 
on Treaties (JSCOT), which made recommendations on each proposed action to the 
executive government to consider. 5  In the author’s opinion, the government’s 
                                                          
3  Ibid Principle 12: ‘States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable 
development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental 
degradation.’ 
4  See eg, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Annex, 4 September 2002, 
UN Doc A/CONF.199/20; D Zaelke, D Kaniaru, and E Kruzikova (eds), Making Law 
Work: Environmental Compliance & Sustainable Development (vol 1, 2005). 
5  The NIA and JSCOT processes were introduced by the Howard government early in 
its incumbency, fulfilling an electoral promise. See: D Williams, ‘Australia’s Treaty 
Making Processes: The Coalitions Reform Proposals’ in P Alston and M Chiam (eds), 
Treaty-making and Australia: globalization versus sovereignty? (1995) 185-95; and 
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/ 
index.htm>. 
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approaches to international environmental law issues served Australia’s national 
interests well, for the most part, especially in relation to sustainable management of 
the marine environment and the natural resources in the Western Pacific region. 
However, it failed to properly appreciate the high national cost of its rejection of 
the international consensus on climate change. 
How well the government served as a global environmental citizen is a more 
ambiguous assessment and is not attempted here. The notion of the ‘objectives of 
the international community’ implies the identification of international actors or 
agents in terms that set out a consolidated and defined position on a particular 
political issue that can then be compared with the Australian government’s position 
on that issue. Yet the international community is difficult to identify and legitimate 
in representative terms (ie who is an authoritative representative of the collective?) 
and its objectives or interests are usually difficult to define and to legitimate in 
environmental terms (ie what is the best scientific and socio-economic policy?). In 
the two instances of treaties that the Howard government negotiated but, in contrast 
to most states, did not ratify (concerning greenhouse gas emissions reductions and 
biosafety in the trade in genetically modified organisms), it can be asserted that the 
government did not meet the consensus standards set for global environmental 
citizenship. Ultimately, however, the Howard government’s impact on the 
development of international law to protect the environment cannot be 
simplistically assessed as good or bad overall. It needs finer focus in respect of the 
various outcomes in each sector of international environmental law.  
II. Method 
International law in the field of environment and natural resources is comprised 
principally of rights and obligations established by treaties. Thus, this paper 
focuses on approaches to Australian environmental treaties in both the treaties 
negotiation and implementation phases. Treaty rights and obligations are 
supplemented by the environmental principles established or emerging under 
customary international law. Those principles guide negotiations for cooperative 
arrangements, although their precise content and legal status are often not well 
crystallised. Towards the end of this paper the congruence or divergence of the 
government’s approaches with these international environmental principles is 
briefly addressed. 
Australia is party to 241 treaties classified as directly related to environment 
and natural resources management.6 Obviously, the enquiry conducted here cannot 
be comprehensive. It focuses on only a few major treaties. It is organised by 
distinguishing treaties according to environmental sectors. Examination of each 
sector prevents the use of ‘cherry-picked’ or biased examples to demonstrate an 
asserted ‘Howard government approach’. This provides a more robust analytical 
method than selective examples and also facilitates coherent description of 
innovative policies adopted in each area, while allowing cross-sectoral analysis to 
draw out the common themes in each of the government’s approaches. However, 
                                                          
6  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Treaties Database 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/index.html>. 
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the division of environmental treaties into sectoral groups is an approximate 
exercise. Most treaties embrace some matters across sectors or are by nature 
cross-sectoral.  
The author is indebted for information presented here to the annual reports on 
Australia published in the Yearbook of International Environmental Law.7 Other 
sources include journal publications and the federal government department 
websites.  
III. Review and Analysis 
The treaty groupings identified for the purposes of this study are: biodiversity 
conservation, marine environment protection, marine living resources management, 
atmosphere protection, hazardous materials management, and the general 
framework of principles for sustainable development. 
(a) Biodiversity conservation 
In relation to biodiversity conservation, the following section examines the Howard 
government’s approaches to implementation of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity8 (CBD) and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol),9 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna 10  (CITES), the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 11  (Ramsar Convention) and the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage12 (World 
Heritage Convention). 
(i) Biological diversity  
The idea for a major reform of Commonwealth environmental legislation 
germinated in the latter days of the Keating government. However, the 
conceptualisation and development of new legislation was the work of Robert Hill, 
environment minister under the Howard government. The Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) Chapter 5 sets out obligations 
for the conservation of biodiversity. It came into force in 2000, signifying a major 
evolutionary step in Commonwealth implementation of the CBD.  
The EPBC Act takes a comprehensive and programmatic approach to 
biodiversity conservation. It requires the identification, listing and monitoring of 
Australian biological diversity. Identified threatened species and ecological 
communities are to be protected, including through the use of recovery plans. Alien 
species that may threaten Australian biodiversity are to be controlled and 
                                                          
7  Yearbook of International Environmental Law (1996-2006). Australian reports therein 
have been variously contributed by Donald R Rothwell, Stephen Bowhuis, Maureen 
Grant-Thomson, Mark Driver, and officers of the Australian Office of International 
Law at the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department. 
8  (5 June 1992), 170 UNTS 143. 
9  (29 January 2000), 39 ILM 1027. 
10  (3 March 1973), 993 UNTS 243. 
11  (2 February 1971), 996 UNTS 245. 
12  [1975] ATS 47. 
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addressed, including through threat abatement plans. A range of types of protected 
areas can be declared and, in a novel step, systems for their regulation are 
specified, especially management plans. In another innovative measure, Part 14 of 
the Act provides for the adoption of agreements between the government and other 
persons for the conservation of biodiversity on private or public land or in marine 
areas. In conformity with the CBD, the Act also provides for the making of 
regulations to control access to biological resources as forms of material and 
intellectual property. 13  These legal reforms were underpinned by major new 
funding: approximately $A2.5 billion was made available under the Natural 
Heritage Trust established by the government.14  
The EPBC Act delivered relatively rigorous management mechanisms to 
implement the CBD. The Act requires the use of a variety of specifically adapted 
management plans and gives them a coherent legal basis, moving beyond the 
previous policy-based strategy. 15  It also reflected the Howard government’s 
conviction that market forces should be harnessed in the sphere of environmental 
management, as evident in the use of conservation agreements with private 
landholders. Initial conservationist criticisms of it have generally moderated 
towards more positively nuanced perspectives.16 
                                                          
13  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 301. 
Commonwealth regulations were adopted in 2000 that require that, in order to obtain 
access, a researcher must come to an agreement with the access provider to share the 
benefits of the commercial research: Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Regulations 2000 (Cth) pt 8A. See C Lawson, ‘Implementing an 
objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity – Intellectual Property, access to 
genetic resources and benefit sharing in Australia’ (2005) 22 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 130. 
14  National Heritage Trust <http://www.nht.gov.au/index.html>. The Natural Heritage 
Trust was created using revenue coming from the partial privatisation of the national 
telecommunications carrier, Telstra, in an arrangement negotiated with a minority 
party, the Democrats, to secure the Democrats vote for the privatisation. 
15  Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s 
Biological Diversity (1996). 
16  S Chappell, ‘The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth): One Year Later’ (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523; 
A Nugent, ‘A Revolutionary Three Years in Environmental Management? The 
Implementation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act ‘ 
(2003) No 3 National Environmental Law Review 30; A McIntosh, ‘Why the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act’s Referral, Assessment 
and Approval Process is Failing to Meet its Environmental Objectives’ (2004) 21 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 268; C McGrath, ‘Swells in the Stream of 
Australian Environmental Law: Debate on the EPBC Act’ (2006) 23 Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 165; L Thomas and T Stephens, ‘Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act: New Prospects for Effective Implementation?’ 
(2007) 18 Public Law Review 84; J Peel and L Godden, ‘The Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act: Dark Sides of Virtue’ (2007) 31 Melbourne 
University Law Review 106. 
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(ii) Biosafety  
Throughout the conduct of negotiations for the Biosafety Protocol, the Howard 
government sought to protect trade opportunities for Australian agricultural 
holdings that wished to use living genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
particularly for crop plantings.17 The government therefore formed a negotiating 
bloc with like-minded agricultural produce exporting countries, called the Miami 
Group, which sought to avoid the imposition of trade barriers against the 
importation of GMO-derived agricultural produce by other countries.18 Ultimately, 
the Biosafety Protocol, as adopted in 2000, does not apply to produce processed 
from GMO materials (such as canola oil processed from rape seed), thereby 
enabling trade in them. However, in relation to living GMOs (such as seeds), it 
requires an exporting country to seek a permit from the importing country’s 
authorities. It also requires the importing country to base its decision on a robust 
scientific and economic assessment of the anticipated detrimental impact of the 
GMOs. Therefore, trade in living GMOs is restricted, although by an agreed 
procedure. 
Ultimately, the government did not ratify the Biosafety Protocol,19 reflecting its 
concerns to maintain open trade for Australian commodities exporters. It thereby 
failed to undertake a share of responsibility to avoid harm to potential importing 
countries. This could contribute to an erosion of perceptions of Australia’s bona 
fides, particularly in light of domestic steps taken to ensure the safeguarding of the 
Australian environment and people from biosafety risks.20 
(iii) Wildlife trade 
In 2002, a newly inserted Part 13A of the EPBC Act commenced operation, 
replacing the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act of 1982 
that regulated wildlife trade and implemented CITES. Part 13A streamlined permits 
for commercial operators, enhanced transparency of decision-making and 
strengthened enforcement powers. The three appendices of the previous Act, that 
                                                          
17  For the same policy reason, Australia joined as a third party in the complaints brought 
by Argentina, Canada and the United States against a European Union moratorium on 
imports of GMO agricultural and food products; see: EC - Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products WT/DS291 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_ 
e/ds291_e.htm>. 
18  A substantial proportion of farmers represented in the latter countries did not wish to 
allow importation of GMO crops and produce, because they either use organic farming 
methods or could not compete with large-scale GMO plantings or cannot afford GMO 
seeds, and they feared the possible contamination of their crops by GMO seeds in food 
produce or other imports; see IISD Reporting Services, Earth Negotiations Bulletin – 
EXCOP Biosafety Protocol (2000) <http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/excop/index.html>. 
19  Nor has it been ratified as of the time of writing. 
20  The government developed legislation, passed in 2000, to assess and manage the 
domestic health and environment risks in Australia associated with GMOs: Gene 
Technology Act 2000 (Cth). Management plans are to be developed and adopted with 
the support of the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, an office created to 
address the relevant environmental, public health and safety risks from GMOs: Office 
of the Gene Technology Regulator <http://www.ogtr.gov.au>. 
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corresponded to the three CITES appendices, were consolidated into one list for all 
CITES species.21 
In accordance with CITES (Art XIV), a party can apply stricter trade control 
measures than in CITES itself and this is provided for in the EPBC Act.22 In fact, 
the Commonwealth applies stricter measures to some exotic species, such as 
African elephants, treating them as if listed on CITES Appendix I, which prohibits 
commercial trade, although CITES resolutions have demoted certain African 
populations to Appendix II to allow commercial trade.23 In addition, the EPBC Act 
goes beyond the CITES obligations to address not only species listed in CITES, but 
also all exports of Australian native wildlife and all imports of live exotic 
species.24 In relation to exports of Australian wildlife, the government consistently 
sought to delete from the Annex Australian native species that are listed in Annex 
II of CITES but that are not the subject of international trade.  
Part 13A reflects the Howard government’s emphasis on market efficiency by 
simplifying Australian regulation of international trade in endangered species. It 
also strengthens legal opportunities for domestic enforcement and was welcomed 
by environmental groups in this regard.25 Yet, the government’s unwillingness to 
countenance importation of some exotic species allowed under CITES reflected 
non-acceptance of certain classifications mediated under CITES, even where such 
classifications were introduced to support the conservation of a species, such as for 
the sustainable use of elephants. This unilateralism might suggest the neglect of 
shared responsibility for international trade under CITES in favour of domestic 
electoral concerns. 
(iv) Wetlands 
Australia hosted the 6th Conference of Parties of the 1971 Ramsar Convention 
in Brisbane in the second week of the Howard government’s incumbency, in 
March 1996.The Australian initiatives taken in support of wetlands conservation at 
that time were those of the Keating government. 26  However, the Howard 
                                                          
21  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 303CA. For 
each species included in the list, there is to be a notation describing the specimens 
belonging to that species that are included in a particular Appendix to CITES, 
identifying the Appendix and identifying the date on which the provisions of CITES 
first applied to the specimens: s 303CA(3). 
22  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 303CB. 
23  Consideration of proposals for the transfer of African elephant populations from 
Appendix I to Appendix II, 9-20 June 1997, CITES Doc Conf. 10.9. 
24  The export of native species and import of live specimens are addressed separately in 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 303DA-
303DJ and ss303EA-303EQ, respectively. 
25  TRAFFIC Oceania, ‘New Federal Wildlife Bill Sets World’s Best Practice Standards’ 
(2001), in C Sharma, ‘Enforcement Mechanisms for Endangered Species Protection in 
Hong Kong: A Legal Perspective’ (2003-2004) 5 Vermont Journal of Environmental 
Law 1, 25. 
26  The addition of seven Australian sites to the Ramsar list of Wetlands of International 
Importance, a $A2 million contribution to the Ramsar Convention’s Strategic Plan, 
resource support for the establishment of an international wetlands training program 
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government subsequently acted consistently in continuing that support.27 In 2004, 
the Minister for Environment brought the first civil enforcement action against an 
Australian land-holder for destruction of listed wetlands. Civil penalties in the sum 
of $A450,000 for damage to the Gwydir wetlands were ordered by the Federal 
Court and upheld on appeal in 2005.28 The implementation actions and, especially, 
the enforcement litigation, were indicative of the Howard government’s emphasis 
on compliance with international commitments.  
(v) World heritage 
The Howard government successfully nominated new sites to be listed as 
Australian world heritage areas under the 1972 United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Convention. 
These included the first Australian cultural properties to be listed.29 
The management of Australian sites so as to maintain the world heritage values 
for which they were nominated was a more vexed issue. In 1996, in contrast to the 
Keating government decision not to approve a proposal to build a resort within the 
Wet Tropics of Queensland World Heritage Area, the Howard government 
approved a proposal to construct a marina and to dredge an access channel at Port 
Hinchinbrook, subject to strict conditions. A legal challenge to the approval failed 
before the Federal Court30 and, on appeal, also before the Full Federal Court.31 A 
comparable issue arose in connection with the world heritage area at Kakadu 
National Park, where a proposal was approved for a new uranium mine sited on the 
existing Jabiluka mineral lease, an enclave within the world heritage area. In that 
case the dispute was internationalised by Australian nationals’ representations to 
the World Heritage Bureau. In 1998, the Bureau sent a mission to Australia to 
                                                                                                                                       
for Pacific Island countries and a cooperative project with Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea. 
27  In 1999, for example, it nominated four Ramsar wetlands sites and committed $A0.8 
million to a new National Wetlands Program and to an Asia-Pacific Wetlands 
Managers Training Program. In 2000, an Asia-Pacific Migratory Bird Strategy 2001-
2005, to be coordinated by Wetlands International, was also adopted. In 2001, four 
new sites were nominated for the Ramsar list and six in 2002, and a further one the 
next year. In compliance with the resolutions of Ramsar COP 7, an Australian national 
action plan on wetlands communication, education and awareness was adopted in 
2002. 
28  Minister for Environment and Heritage v Greentree (2004) FCA 1317 and on appeal 
(2005) FCAFC 128; M Baird, ‘The EPBC Act and Ramsar wetlands: an examination 
of the Greentree decisions’ (2004) 3 National Environmental Law Review 42. 
29  These were: 1997 – Heard Island, McDonald Island, Macquarie Island; 2000 – Blue 
Mountains; 2003 – Bungle Bungle Range; 2004 – Melbourne’s Royal Exhibition 
Building and Carlton Gardens; 2007 – Sydney Harbour, Opera House and foreshore. 
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Australian places on 
the World Heritage List (2008) <http://www.environment.gov.au/heritage/places/ 
world/index.html>. 
30  Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment [1997] FCA 55; see R 
Lyster, ‘The Relevance of the Precautionary Principle: Friends of Hinchinbrook 
Society Inc v Minister for Environment’ (1997) 14 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 390. 
31  Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment [1998] FCA 433. 
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investigate the site and the proposal. It considered that the proposed mine 
development posed threats to the site’s world heritage values and it recommended 
that the mine be closed. The report, recommendations and the government’s 
response (which rejected the report and recommendations) were considered by the 
UNESCO World Heritage Committee in 1999, which decided not to list the Park as 
a world heritage site in danger but was critical of the proposal and of the 
government’s management of it.32  
The controversies over Port Hinchinbrook and Kakadu were succeeded by new 
measures to prevent further emerging management challenges at the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park and Shark Bay world heritage areas. The Howard government 
invested substantial resources into improved management of Australian world 
heritage sites. In 1997, it announced initiatives to better protect their world heritage 
values by developing management plans, protecting critical habitat and upgrading 
interpretation and visitor facilities.33 For many sites there had previously been no 
management plans. In 1998, a report on Australia’s world heritage sites made 
recommendations for their improved management and, the following year, a new 
legislative regime was adopted for Australia’s world heritage sites. 34  These 
introduced management systems to maintain the values of world heritage sites, 
enhancing Australian implementation of the World Heritage Convention35  and 
again reflected the Howard government’s emphasis on compliance with 
international obligations. 
(b) Marine environment protection 
In relation to protection of the marine environment, the following section examines 
the Howard government’s approach to marine protected areas, waste dumping, and 
Antarctica. Australian approaches to the regulation of vessel-based sources of 
pollution under the 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 36  and related treaties adopted under the auspices of the 
International Maritime Organisation are not addressed here. The practice of the 
Howard government in this technically detailed field remained, consistent with 
previous Australian governments, environmentally proactive and generally 
demonstrated good compliance. 
(i) Marine protected areas 
In 1998, the international Year of the Oceans, the government adopted 
Australia’s Oceans Policy (AOP). 37  The AOP establishes a framework for 
                                                          
32  B Boer and G Wiffen, Heritage Law in Australia (2005), 87. 
33  Eg, for Shark Bay a new administrative agreement between the Commonwealth and 
Western Australian governments was adopted. 
34  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3 sub-div A. 
35  But see: Boer and Wiffen, above n 32, 76; D Haigh, ‘Australian World Heritage, the 
Constitution and International Law’ (2005) 22 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 385. 
36  (2 November 1973), 1340 UNTS 184, reprinted in (1973) 12 ILM 1319. 
37  Senator R Hill, ‘World First Plan to Safeguard Our Oceans’ (Press Release, 23 
December 1998). 
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integrated ecosystem-based planning and management for Commonwealth waters 
that aims to promote ecologically sustainable development of marine resources in a 
way that both encourages industry and protects biological diversity.38 An important 
facet of the marine conservation objectives of the AOP was the establishment of a 
National Representative System of Marine Protected Areas. It was to ensure a 
‘comprehensive, adequate and representative’ system of marine protected areas 
throughout the nation’s waters.39 The first of these was the Great Australian Bight 
Marine Park, proclaimed in 1998, as Australia’s (and, at the time, the world’s) 
second-largest marine park (after the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park). In 1999, the 
Tasmanian Seamounts Marine Reserve and Macquarie Island Marine Park were 
declared. In July 2007, three years after the adoption of the South East Region 
Marine Plan, 13 new marine protected areas for that region, comprising the largest 
temperate water MPA network in the world (all in Commonwealth waters), were 
declared.40 Protection of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park World Heritage Area 
was strengthened by a series of amendments to regulations under the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Act 1975 and to the Act itself, that extended prohibitions on 
mining in 1999, strengthened measures to prevent shipping accidents in 2002, 
rezoned the Area so as to increase the percentage under full environmental 
protection from 4 per cent to 33 per cent in 2004 as well as by a major review of 
the Act in 2006 to introduce, inter alia, broader management planning.41 These 
developments assist Australia in meeting its CBD obligations in the marine sector. 
They indicate a whole-of-government approach and a concern with compliance.  
(ii) Waste dumping at sea 
In 1998, the government removed the Australian reservation to amendments on 
disposal of industrial wastes at sea under the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter42 (London Convention). 
The reservation had been made in 1994 by the previous government to allow for a 
phase-out period, completed in 1998, for the sea dumping of jarosite wastes, a 
tailing from mining, off the coast of Tasmania. During 1996, a Protocol that 
extensively revised the London Convention was adopted by the Convention parties. 
The government ratified the Protocol in 2001 after passing amendments in 1999 to 
the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 so as to be able to implement 
the Protocol.43 The Protocol itself came into force in 2006, the same year that 
Australia submitted a formal proposal to amend the Protocol by listing carbon 
dioxide as a waste that may be discharged into the seabed. That amendment came 
                                                          
38  Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Ocean Policy (1998) 2. 
39  Ibid 45. 
40  The areas were identified in May 2006 and declared in July 2007, see: Senator 
I Campbell, ‘Australia leads world with new Marine Protected Areas’ (Press Release, 
5 May 2006); the Hon M Turnbull, ‘World’s First Temperate Network of Marine 
Reserves Declared’ (Press Release, 5 July 2007). 
41  Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority <http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au>. 
42  (13 November 1972) [1985] ATS 16. 
43  Department of Environment, Dumping Wastes at Sea (2002) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/pollution/dumping/dumping.html>. 
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into force in 2007 to enable the geosequestration of greenhouse gases below the 
seabed, such by injecting them into cavities left by exhausted natural gas 
deposits. 44  Geosequestration is of potentially great significance for Australian 
offshore oil and gas producers, although its technological and economic viability 
has not yet been proved. The government’s approach in this area was characterised 
by concern to protect sovereign interests, that is, the exploitation of national 
hydrocarbon reserves, and to facilitate the use of industry-driven solutions to global 
warming such as geosequestration 
(iii) Antarctica 
In 1999, the government announced that it would assert jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf beyond the Australian exclusive economic zone offshore of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). GeoScience Australia gathered information 
on the geological extent of the continental shelf around mainland Australia and its 
territories.45 In time to meet the international deadline of 2004, under Annex II of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea46 (UNCLOS), a submission setting out 
all Australia’s extended continental shelf claims was made to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the relevant body established under that 
Convention. However, Australia requested that the Commission postpone its 
consideration of the Australian Antarctic continental shelf claim. The apparent 
reason for the postponement of the AAT-related claim concerned the unresolved 
Australian maritime boundaries with bordering Antarctic claimant states (France, 
New Zealand and Norway). The Commission agreed to postpone consideration of 
the AAT extended continental shelf claim and, in 2008, it approved the other 
Australian extended continental shelf claims submitted.47  The vast majority of 
countries do not recognise the legitimacy of national claims to territorial 
sovereignty or appurtenant maritime zones claimed in the Antarctic region. The 
government’s reason for postponement would certainly have been the likelihood of 
political challenges being made by other non-claimant states against Australia’s 
Antarctic claim. Both Japan and the United States had objected to Australia’s 
unilateral claim to an Antarctic exclusive economic zone in 1994 and more were 
likely to do so in the multilateral process required for approval of an extended 
continental shelf. In contrast, France, New Zealand and Norway have since 
                                                          
44  International Maritime Organisation, Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (2002) 
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45  Geoscience Australia, Law of the Sea (2008) <http://www.ga.gov.au/oceans/mc_los_ 
More.jsp>. In the summers of 2000 and 2001, bathymetric surveys were conducted 
and data was processed in 2003 to determine the geological limits of the AAT 
continental shelf. 
46  (10 December 1982), 1833 UNTS 397. 
47  Commonwealth of Australia, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Outer 
Limits of Australia’s Continental Shelf Extending Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the 
Territorial Sea Baseline – Executive Summary (2004); Statement by the Chairman of 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work in the 
Commission, 25 April 2008, UN Doc CLCS/58. 
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submitted extended continental shelf claims but have not claimed an Antarctic 
extended continental shelf.  
This episode demonstrated the Howard government’s emphasis on robust 
assertion of sovereign rights. It also demonstrated continuity with previous 
Australian governments. In 1994, the Keating government had declared an 
exclusive economic zone offshore of the AAT. However, the claim to an AAT 
extended continental shelf entailed higher financial and political risks, as the 
continental shelf survey cost $A32 million and a UN multilateral deliberative 
process was required for consideration of the claim. Nevertheless, the government 
decided to make this Australian claim to the extended continental shelf and to 
manage the associated political risks. 
(c) Marine living resources management 
Under the rubric of marine living resources, this section considers mainland 
fisheries, Antarctic fisheries and marine wildlife.  
(i) Mainland fisheries 
Heightening concerns around the world concerning pressures on unsustainably 
harvested fish stocks were shared by the Howard government. It was extremely 
active in relation to a wide range of fisheries management efforts bordering the 
mainland in the Arafura Sea, Central and Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and 
Southern Ocean.  
The government initiated action in 1999, in partnership with South Africa and 
Belize, to prevent vessels registered in those countries from continuing to poach 
Orange Roughy (Hoplosthethus Atlanticis) off the South Tasman Rise in Australian 
southern waters, or to harvest fish stocks straddling Australian waters in a high seas 
area being regulated by both Australia and New Zealand. South Africa cooperated 
by revoking the licences of its vessels and Belize by deregistering them.48 In the 
Arafura Sea, illegal fishing by mostly Indonesian fishers was also addressed by 
strengthened law enforcement. Additional resources were allocated to surveillance 
and interdiction, and facilities built for the detention of illegal fishers and for the 
destruction of their forfeited vessels. Legislation was amended to enable foreign 
fishers caught fishing illegally in the territorial sea to be jailed.49 The government 
found legal avenues to detain crews of foreign vessels caught fishing illegally also 
in the Australian exclusive economic zone, including for default on payment of a 
fine and for resisting apprehension. 50  Laws increasing financial penalties for 
foreign illegal fishing and imposing automatic forfeiture of the vessel, gear and 
catch from the time of commencement of illegal fishing were imposed.51 The 
legality some of these measures under the UNCLOS, which does not permit a 
coastal state to imprison foreign fishers for fishing illegally in its exclusive 
                                                          
48  Orange Roughy was also listed as a ‘conservation dependent’ species under s 194Q of 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). 
49  Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 100B (as amended in 2006). 
50  W Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia (2008) 312. 
51  Ibid 313. 
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economic zone and requires the release of the vessel upon payment of a ‘reasonable 
bond’,52 has been questioned.53 Nevertheless, poaching dropped dramatically.54  
The government ratified the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas in 2004. The government also sought to enforce responsible fisheries 
management through international dispute settlement mechanisms, as demonstrated 
in the case of southern bluefin tuna (thunnus maccoyii). This highly migratory 
species ranges through Australia’s exclusive economic zone and the adjacent high 
seas.55 Under UNCLOS, states are obliged to cooperate in the management of such 
highly migratory stocks.56  To better manage the stock, an agreement between 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand had been adopted in 1993, that is, the 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 57  (CCSBT). The 
CCSBT is premised on the Parties agreeing to a total allowable catch for the stock. 
Unfortunately, Japan assessed the stock biomass as much more abundant than did 
Australia and New Zealand and the Parties failed to agree on any quota after 1996. 
In 1998, Japan commenced an extensive ‘experimental fishing program’ for 1,464 
tons. Despite Australia’s important trade relationship with Japan, the Howard 
government took the dispute to arbitration in 2000.58 The tribunal decided that it 
did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter on the merits59 and, so, the dispute 
resolution mechanism did not yield the result desired by the government.  
                                                          
52  Above n 46, art 73. 
53  Gullett, above n 50, 312; R Baird ‘Foreign Fisheries Enforcement: Do Not Pass Go, 
Proceed Slowly to Jail – Is Australia Playing by the Rules?’ (2007) 30 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
54  Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Oceans Action 
Bulletin: 1 June 2007 (2007) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/oceans-action/june-07.html>. 
55  Due to over fishing, the biomass of the stock had fallen to 10 per cent of its 1980 
levels by 1996. It is fished primarily by Japanese fishing vessels as it is prized for 
flavourful sashimi. 
56  Above n 46, art 64. 
57  (10 May 1993), 1819 UNTS 359. 
58  In 1999, Australia and New Zealand applied successfully to the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for an injunction against Japan’s ‘experimental fishing 
program’: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) 
(Provisional Measures) (1999) 38 ILM 1624. This decision was discussed in the agora 
of the 2000 Yearbook of International Environmental Law. A general arbitral tribunal 
established under Annex VII of the UNCLOS heard the matter for the resolution on 
the merits in 2000: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australian and New Zealand v 
Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359. This decision was 
discussed in D Bialek, ‘Australia & New Zealand v Japan: Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Case’ (2000) 1 Melbourne Journal of International Law 153. 
59  The arbitral panel decided (4:1) that it did not have jurisdiction under UNCLOS 
because the CCSBT governed the dispute and its dispute resolution procedure required 
that its Parties continue with their negotiations. Its decision has been controversial: 
D Colson and P Hoyle, ‘Satisfying the Procedural Prerequisites to the Compulsory 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Did the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get It Right?’ (2003) 34 Ocean Development & 
International Law 59; B Kwiatowska, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Did Get It 
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In the Central and Western Pacific, the government worked through the Forum 
Fisheries Agency to ensure the strongest possible conservation and enforcement 
provisions in the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,60 which was 
adopted in 2001 and ratified by Australia in 2003.61 The government supported 
measures adopted by the Convention’s regional fisheries commission in 2006 to 
enable parties to board and inspect each other’s fishing vessels to monitor 
compliance with regional operational standards.  
In mainland fisheries, a strong emphasis on enforcement was apparent in 
government, most often in the form of committing resources for surveillance of 
Australian waters, arrest of illegal foreign fishing vessels and their domestic 
prosecution. No international court action to compel another country to perform its 
environmental responsibilities was taken after the unfavourable outcome in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case,62 which might have signalled that arbitral tribunals 
cannot be relied upon to confirm what the government considered to be its own 
environmental rights and others’ obligations in the exclusive economic zone. The 
Howard government’s concern to safeguard Australian sovereign rights in the 
exclusive economic zone thereafter manifested itself in robust unilateral and 
bilateral enforcement arrangements. 
(ii) Antarctic fisheries  
The most extraordinary efforts by the government to ensure protection of 
Australian natural resources by enforcing compliance with fisheries laws took 
place in sub-Antarctic waters. In 1996, Australia was enabled by the Commission 
for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR)63 to open a new commercial fishery in its sub-Antarctic waters off 
Heard Island and McDonald Island (HIMI), which fall within a zone largely 
co-regulated by CCAMLR and Australia.64 The Howard government increased its 
surveillance of sub-Antarctic waters and the Royal Australian Navy seized two 
foreign vessels fishing illegally in those waters in 1997. 65  Huge efforts were 
                                                                                                                                       
Right: A Commentary and Reply to the Article by David A Colson and Dr Peggy 
Hoyle’ 34 Ocean Development & International Law 369. The parties did continue to 
negotiate management and compliance measures and, in 2006, based upon evidence in 
scientific and technical reports, Japan agreed to halve its catch. 
60  (5 September 2001) 40(2) ILM 277, [2004] ATS 15. 
61  G Rose, ‘Oceania’ (2000) 10 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 596. 
62  Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional 
Measures) (1999) 38 ILM 1624; Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australian and New 
Zealand v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359. 
63  33 UST 3476; 1329 UNTS 48; (1980) 19 ILM 841. 
64  In that year CCAMLR decided on new conservation measures for highly sought after 
Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides also known as Chilean Sea Bass) and 
Australia was therefore able to administer complementary implementing measures in 
its HIMI waters, licensing vessels to fish there. Consequently, the licensed Australian 
vessels reported illegal foreign fishing vessels there. 
65  The Salvore (registered in Belize) and the Aliza Glacial (registered in Panama): 
R Baird, ‘Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of Australian Enforcement 
Action in the Heard and McDonald Islands Australian Fishing Zone’ (2004) 9 Deakin 
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exerted to arrest the South Tomi in 2001. That vessel, registered in Togo, was 
pursued for 14 days across the Indian Ocean, from Australia’s sub-Antarctic waters 
nearly into South African waters.66 But that was not maximal effort. In 2003, the 
Viarsa I, a Uruguayan registered vessel, was arrested after a hot pursuit that lasted 
21 days and covered 4,000 nautical miles.67 Further arrests were made in the 
following years and, in each case, the master and/or crew were charged with 
offences and the vessel, catch and gear forfeited to the government under new 
Australian fisheries law.68  These laws pushed the limits of international legal 
constraints on coastal state enforcement rights imposed under UNCLOS.69 
The arrests of the South Tomi and Viarsa were assisted by the South African 
and United Kingdom governments. Other HIMI fisheries enforcement were also 
characterised by international cooperative arrangements. Amid information that 
some of vessels arrested in the 1997/1998 season were operated by Norwegian 
interests under flags of convenience, the government negotiated successfully with 
Norway in 1998 for tighter Norwegian regulation of its nationals operating 
overseas. Australia and France signed in 2003 a Treaty on Cooperation in the 
Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard 
Island and the McDonald Islands.70 It facilitates cooperation in scientific research 
and in surveillance and enforcement in their sub-Antarctic territories. Negotiations 
were commenced for a formal agreement with South Africa.71 
At the multilateral level, a broader system for stronger fisheries enforcement 
was advanced by the Howard government’s promotion of the catch documentation 
scheme, eventually adopted by CCAMLR in 1999. The scheme requires that a 
catch be documented according to its location and fishing methodology before it 
can be given market access to a CCAMLR state. 72  In 2004, the government 
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66  Ibid. 
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<http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=14710>. 
68  In 2002, the Lena and the Volga, both Russian registered vessels, were arrested, as was 
the Uruguayan registered Maya V in 2004 and the Cambodian Taruman in 2005. 
69  Russia successfully contested the terms of a bond for release of the detained Volga 
(see Volga Case (Russian Federation v Australia), ITLOS Case No 11, 23 December 
2002 (2003) 42 ILM 159): W Gullett, ‘Developments in Australian Fisheries Law: 
Setting the Law of the Sea Convention Adrift?’ (2004) 21 Environmental and 
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government at the time that the vessel commences illegal fishing in Australian waters: 
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 106A; Gullett, above n 50, 314. 
70  [2004] ATNIA 8; JSCOT Rep 63; [2005] ATS 6. 
71  A second agreement was adopted in 2007: W Gullett and C Schofield, ‘Pushing the 
limits of the Law of the Sea Convention: Australian and French cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement in the Southern Ocean’ (2007) 22 International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 545. 
72  This is a significant constraint on illegal fishing because 90 per cent of Patagonian 
Toothfish is marketed within CCAMLR states. The government also proposed the 
listing of Patagonian Toothfish in Appendix II of the CITES at COP 12 in 2002. 
Listing would require that trade in that species be subject to the issue by national 
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supported CCAMLR’s adoption of a centralised, common standard satellite-based 
vessel monitoring system. It also supported the electronic adaptation of the catch 
documentation scheme, better use and public dissemination of the Illegal 
Unregulated and Unreported Vessel List that blacklists known offending vessels, as 
well as enhanced systems for reporting sightings of potential illegal vessels.73 
The high intensity of effort required for effective surveillance and arrest of 
poaching vessels in HIMI again reflected the Howard government’s determination 
to assert and defend Australian sovereign rights. It also indicated an application of 
shared responsibility, where other states regulating fisheries operators, vessel 
registers or contiguous fisheries were approached to share responsibility to curtail 
poaching. Finally, it also suggested an inconsistency in maintaining the freedom of 
markets, as the government uncharacteristically supported the use of the measures 
to constrain trade by means of the Patagonian Toothfish catch documentation 
scheme.  
(iii) Marine wildlife 
Throughout its period in office, the Howard government demonstrated that it 
valued shared responsibility for the management of migratory species. In 1996, 11 
species of albatross were listed in Appendices I and II under the Convention for the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 74  (Bonn Convention) 
following an initiative of the Australian government. Albatross, which migrate 
through the Southern Ocean region, are being decimated as incidental catch in 
long-line fishing operations. In 1999, the government also supported the listing of 
seven species of petrels under the Bonn Convention. That year, it led a further 
initiative to negotiate a new regional convention under the aegis of the Bonn 
Convention to conserve albatross, holding a meeting of southern hemisphere range 
states in Hobart in 2000. The Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and 
Petrels was adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. Australia served as 
interim secretariat and, on entry into force, as permanent secretariat.75 
In relation to sea turtles, the government submitted third party proceedings to 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) against 
trade-related environmental measures taken by the United States. A breach of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was asserted concerning 
unilateral restrictions that prevented importation into the United States of shrimp 
harvested by means that caused high incidental mortality to sea turtles. Australia’s 
third party submission was not motivated by a desire to protect Australian shrimp 
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73  R Baird, ‘CCAMLR Initiatives to Counter Flag State Non Enforcement in Southern 
Ocean Fisheries’ (2005) 36 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 733. 
74  (1980) 19 ILM 15; [1991] ATS 32. 
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exports,76 but to protect trade freedoms from unilateral restrictions disguised as 
environmental protection measures, consistent with the government’s positions 
adopted in the WTO Trade and Environment Committee. The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body found that, although the restrictions were bona fide conservation 
measures, their application was arbitrary.77 That the Howard government’s third 
party submission was designed to curtail future environmentally disguised trade 
restrictions is suggested by the apparently weak Australian direct national interest 
in the circumstances.  
From the outset, the Howard government strongly opposed whaling. In 1996, 
its first year of office, it established a National Taskforce on Whaling to investigate 
ways to support a permanent international ban on whaling. The Taskforce reported 
in 1997 and, in response, the government adopted a policy for international 
anti-whaling initiatives to be promoted through the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC).78 In furtherance of its policy, the government proposed the 
establishment of a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary to the IWC in 2000, 2002 and 
2003.79 The government successfully moved in 2002 for the Conference of Parties 
to the Bonn Convention to list in Appendix I of the Convention sei, fin and sperm 
whales (as species that are endangered and must be protected), and to list in 
Appendix II Brydes, Antarctic minke and pygmy right whales (as species having an 
unfavourable conservation status).80 Nevertheless, despite its robust approach in 
international fora, the government was not willing to arrest Japanese whaling 
vessels engaged in whaling in Australia’s Antarctic waters, although they were 
clearly in breach of Australian law.81 Nor would it initiate legal action against 
whaling companies under either Australian law (where breach was clear) or under 
international law (where a breach was much less certain). Instead, action for an 
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injunction against Japanese whalers was taken by a non-governmental organisation 
in the Australian Federal Court. The Attorney-General, in a 2005 amicus curiae 
brief requested by the bench, invited the Court to exercise its discretion not to 
proceed on grounds of harm to Australia’s international relations.82  
The Howard government’s anti-whaling policy was consistent with the 
previous Fraser, Hawke and Keating governments’ opposition to commercial 
whaling.83 The symbolic cause of whale protection is popular and has negligible 
economic cost, making it an attractive soapbox issue. However, the government’s 
apparently emotional and morally principled stance appears inconsistent with its 
rational and managerial approach to other international environmental issues. 
When it came to a test that would possibly result in a Japanese international legal 
challenge to Australian sovereign rights to regulate whaling in the AAT exclusive 
economic zone (and harm the delicate balance of Antarctic Treaty cooperative 
relations), the government was unwilling to risk its claim to sovereign rights.84 
Thus, protection of Australian sovereign rights was the government’s paramount 
consideration. 
(d) Atmosphere protection 
The international legal aspects of atmosphere protection revolve around the 1987 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 85  (Montreal 
Protocol) and the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 86 
(UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.87  
(i) Ozone layer 
Australia has a direct national interest in reversing stratospheric ozone 
depletion in the southern hemisphere’s high latitudes due to the resultant ultraviolet 
radiation exposure that harms Australian life. The government accepted the 1997 
Montreal Amendments to the Montreal Protocol in 1998 and a Methyl Bromide 
Strategy was put in place to phase-out methyl bromide use in Australia’s 
horticultural industries within the Montreal Protocol’s 2005 deadline. In 2000, the 
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Australian Halon Management Strategy was instituted to provide a framework for 
management of Australia’s halon stocks to 2030 and the ultimate elimination of 
their use. The National Halon Bank is designed to help reduce halon stocks 
throughout the Asia-Pacific through collection and storage and to supply it for 
essential uses in Australia and overseas. The 1999 Beijing Amendments to the 
Montreal Protocol regulating bromochloromethane were accepted in 2005. 
Australia’s implementation of the Montreal Protocol has long been conscientious, 
under the Howard and previous governments, due to the perception that the global 
regime can and does work and has a high, direct national benefit. It contrasts 
strongly with the Howard government’s approach to multilateral cooperation to 
combat climate change. 
(ii) Climate change 
The Howard government maintained the negotiation position of the Keating 
government when it took over participation in multilateral negotiations for a 
protocol to the UNFCCC in 1996. It indicated its opposition to global warming 
mitigation measures in the form of legally binding targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) reductions. Although such targets were ultimately adopted when 
the negotiations concluded in 1997, Robert Hill, then Minister for Environment, 
negotiated into the morning of the last night to secure economically favourable 
outcomes for Australia.88 These outcomes included agreement on no gross GHG 
emission reduction target for Australia and the recognition of land use and forestry 
changes as mitigation measures. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol allows Australia to 
increase its GHG emissions by 8 per cent above the 1990 ‘baseline level’ during 
the 2008-2012 ‘commitment period’89 and counts reductions in the rate of land 
clearing (ie removal of native forest) and increases in afforestation towards 
emission reductions.90  
In 1999, JSCOT inconclusively considered ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
pending resolution of outstanding negotiation issues and, in 2000, the Minister 
indicated that these issues included substantial accounting for carbon sinks, 
refinement of market-based approaches to minimise the cost of GHG abatement 
such as credits for emissions trading and for investment in low emissions 
technology in developing countries (ie the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’), and 
measures to engage developing countries in emissions reduction commitments. 
Despite negotiation progress on some of these issues, in 2002, he announced that 
Australia would not ratify the Protocol, although it would honour the target under 
the Protocol, by containing Australia’s GHG emissions growth to 8 per cent.  
That year, the Howard government began to explore international cooperative 
initiatives outside the Protocol to mitigate GHGs. A bilateral Climate Action 
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Partnership was entered into with the United States, focusing initially on 
technological cooperation to innovate in the area of clean coal, geosequestration 
and alternative options for remote area energy supply. In 2003, Australia 
formalised bilateral cooperative arrangements with China, New Zealand and the 
European Union. In 2006 a bilateral partnership was initiated with Japan and South 
Africa.91 
At the multilateral level, the Howard government pursued its climate change 
agenda outside the Kyoto Protocol principally through the Asia Pacific Partnership 
on Clean Development and Climate (APP), established in 2006, and through 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Members of the APP are Australia, 
Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea and the United States, comprising both public- 
and private-sector participants.92 At the APEC annual Leaders Summit, held in 
Sydney in 2007, the Sydney Declaration on Climate Change was adopted. The 
twenty-one APEC leaders, including developing countries such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, stated the general objective of reducing GHGs, after the Kyoto Protocol 
expires in 2012, by utilising methods such as energy efficiency, low emissions 
technologies and by arresting deforestation.93  The government also committed 
$A200 million to a Global Initiative on Forests and Climate to prevent 
deforestation in developing countries, including in the Kalimantan forests in 
Indonesia.  
Several measures to contain Australian GHG emissions growth, particularly 
from industrial sources, were undertaken. Most were premised on domestic 
private-sector voluntary steps to be stimulated by financial incentives provided by 
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the government.94 To coordinate GHG emissions accounting and to manage the 
programs, a National Greenhouse Office was established in 1997 as an agency 
under the aegis of both the environment and of the agriculture and forests 
departments. Drawing a variety of measures together, a National Greenhouse 
Strategy was adopted in 1998. However, emissions mitigation measures remained 
based in policy rather than legislative instruments.95 Their voluntary nature and 
inadequate public funding ensured that they were of little effect. The first 
obligatory measure was introduced in 2000, when the government legislated that, 
by 2010, wholesale distributors of electricity must obtain at least a modest 2 per 
cent of their energy from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal or 
tidal energy.96 In 2003, further legislation was enacted on synthetic gases replacing 
substances that deplete the ozone layer, 97  many of which have severe global 
warming effects. The major watershed was the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007, designed to establish a single, national system for reporting 
greenhouse gas emissions, abatement actions and energy consumption and 
production by corporations to underpin the proposed Australian Emissions Trading 
Scheme. In 2006, the government predicted that it would exceed its Kyoto target by 
1 per cent.98  
The Howard government’s decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was the 
most unpopular environmental action of its incumbency, at both domestic and 
international levels. It denied itself international appreciation and positioning at the 
Kyoto implementation negotiation table. It also denied Australian businesses a full 
                                                          
94  Eg, the Greenhouse Challenge program was introduced in 1996 to engage Australian 
companies. Over 100 companies signed voluntary target agreements with the 
government over the following year. Other programs included: 1997 – Safeguarding 
the Future: Australia’s Response to Climate Change, Cities for Climate Protection, 
Bush for Greenhouse, and 1999 – Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program. See 
R Sullivan, ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: A new departure or more of the same?’ 
(2006) 23 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 60; D Jones, ‘The Kyoto 
Protocol, Carbon Sinks and Integrated Environmental Regulation: an Australian 
Perspective’ (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 110. 
95  In 2000, the government issued a discussion paper proposing a legislative amendment 
that would require a national environmental impact assessment process for any 
development proposals that would emit GHG emissions beyond the amount of 
0.5 million tonnes in a year (approximately 10% of Australia’s average annual GHG 
emissions increases from fossil fuel sources). The proposal was not adopted. Similarly, 
a Bill to implement the UNFCCC, proposed by the Greens (Convention on Climate 
Change (Implementation) Bill), obtained no traction in the Senate Committee on 
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts in 1999. 
96  This requirement, known as the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), was 
widely criticised as too unambitious. It is supervised by the Office of the Renewable 
Energy Regulator (established in 2001): <http://www.orer.gov.au>. 
97  Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Amendment 
Regulations 2004 (Cth), under the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas 
Management Act 1989 (Cth). It creates national standards for licensing to control 
activities involving synthetic greenhouse gases. 
98  T M Power, ‘Issues and Opportunities for Australia under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2003) 
20 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 459; Australian Greenhouse Office, 
Tracking to the Kyoto Target 2006 (2006). 
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opportunity to participate early in emerging carbon markets. That drastic decision 
not to ratify might be taken as proof that the government was in thrall to Australian 
domestic mining industry opposition to the Protocol, although that seems unlikely 
given the fact of Australian implementation of the Protocol. 99  Another 
interpretation is that the government made a diplomatic assessment that it would be 
more influential in persuading developing countries to undertake greenhouse gas 
emissions mitigation commitments during negotiation of a new Protocol after the 
Kyoto commitment period expires in 2012 if it maintained the credible threat of 
principled non-participation by developed countries in the absence of developing 
country commitments. The latter interpretation was one of the government’s stated 
positions and is consonant with its emphasis on shared global responsibility, as 
developing countries have no commitment to mitigate GHG emissions under the 
Kyoto Protocol.100 Nevertheless, there were good diplomatic arguments to the 
contrary of that position, not least that ratification was inevitable if Australia was to 
participate in the Kyoto Protocol carbon markets.101 
(e) Hazardous materials  
International coordination and cooperation in the management of hazardous wastes 
and chemicals are primarily regulated under the 1989 Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal102 
(Basel Convention), the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants103 (POPs Convention) and the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade 104  (PIC Convention). Further treaties, not addressed here, 
govern other aspects of hazardous materials management, such as those concerning 
radioactive, pharmaceutical and alimentary substances.  
(i) Hazardous waste 
The Howard government maintained its opposition to a blanket ban on the 
export of hazardous waste to developing countries, consistent with policy of the 
Keating government. Throughout its term, it declined to ratify the amendment to 
the Basel Convention that would make a ban legally binding. However, in a 
                                                          
99  R Lyster, ‘Common but Differentiated?: Australia’s Response to Global Climate 
Change’ (2004) 26 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 561. 
100  The principle of common but differentiated responsibility as manifest in 
environmental treaty provisions provides developing countries with definite but 
delayed or reduced implementation responsibility and provides financial and technical 
assistance to them to promote their implementation efforts. The Montreal Protocol, for 
example, entails common but differentiated developing country responsibilities to 
phase out substances that deplete the ozone layer. For a detailed discussion of the 
principle, see: L Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law 
(2006). 
101  Cogent arguments for ratification, including carbon market positioning, are set out in 
G Pearse High and Dry (2007) 356 ff. 
102  1673 UNTS 126; (1989) 28 ILM 657; [1992] ATS 7. 
103  (2001) 40 ILM 531; [2004] ATS 23. 
104  (1998) 38 ILM 1; [2004] ATS 22. 
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regional compromise in 1998, Australia supported the negotiation of and then 
ratified the Waigani Convention, a South Pacific regional treaty that bans the 
export from outside the region of hazardous wastes to Pacific Forum countries, 
other than to Australia and New Zealand. It allows the export of waste by Pacific 
Forum countries but requires that shipments be conducted in a safe and 
environmentally sound manner. 105  The government also declined to ratify the 
Basel Convention’s liability protocol.106 Regulations under the Hazardous Waste 
(Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989, which implements the Basel 
Convention, were amended in 1999 to accommodate the Waigani Convention and 
amended again in 2003 to accommodate hazardous waste imports into Australia 
from East Timor. Due to the difficulty in identifying the characteristics of 
hazardous wastes while they are in transit, the government accepted newly 
negotiated annexes for the Basel Convention and adopted implementing regulations 
for them in 1998, making it simpler to identify hazardous wastes for the purposes 
of the regulating transboundary movements.107 Further regulatory simplifications 
were adopted in 2004, to implement a binding decision of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that harmonised arrangements 
among its members with the new annexes of the Basel Convention.108  
Although the Howard government met its treaty commitments, it declined to 
ratify the Basel Convention ban which, in its consideration, obstructed recycling of 
hazardous waste. Further, its record of approvals for export of hazardous waste 
indicated shallow implementation of the Basel Convention’s waste minimisation 
and local disposal obligations. The government characteristically preferred to allow 
market forces to operate.109  
                                                          
105  Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and 
Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movements and Management 
of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (16 September 1995), 2161 
UNTS 93. Amendments to the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) 
Regulations 1996 (Cth) were adopted in 1999. 
106  The Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (10 December 
1999) <http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs/prot-e.pdf>, is not widely 
ratified and has not yet entered into force.  
107  Annexes VIII and IX to the Basel Convention provide additional classification 
categories for hazardous waste streams, above n 102. 
108  Revision of Decision C(92)39/FINAL on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations, OECD Doc C(2001)107 (2001) (Decision 
of the Council). The decision addressed transboundary movements for the purpose of 
the recycling of hazardous wastes. Australia is a member of the OECD. 
109  Yet, in 1999, the government declined to allow market forces to operate when it 
prohibited the importation into Australia of radioactive waste for disposal: Customs 
Amendment (Anti-Radioactive Waste Storage Dump) Act 2000 (Cth). 
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(ii) Hazardous chemicals 
A National Strategy for the Management of Scheduled Waste,110 dealing with a 
range of wastes regulated by the Basel Convention, and more particularised waste 
management plans for them, were already in place in 2004, when Australia became 
a party to the POPs Convention. As several hazardous wastes are also persistent 
organic pollutants, there is overlap between the two conventions’ obligations and 
their implementation. Further subject matter overlap occurs with the PIC 
Convention, which was ratified also in 2004. The National Industrial Chemicals 
Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS),111 together with the National 
Registration Scheme for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (NRS)112 managed 
by the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA),113 
both extant at the time of ratification, are used to implement PIC Convention 
obligations. However, as required under the POPs Convention, the government 
published a POPs National Implementation Plan in 2006. The Howard government 
was not enthusiastic in negotiating the new trade restrictive measures employed in 
the hazardous chemicals treaties and utilised mostly existing regulations for their 
implementation. It is likely that this infrastructure will need to be reviewed for its 
international compliance.  
(f) Sustainable development framework 
In drafting the EPBC Act, the Howard government entrenched the fin de siecle 
paradigms of sustainable development. The Act’s extensive objectives include 
ecologically sustainable development,114 which is defined in terms familiar from 
the 1992 UN Summit Conference on Environment and Development.115 Other 
objectives include protection of the environment, conservation of biodiversity, and 
cooperative management with the community, land-holders and indigenous 
peoples. The precautionary principle is separately defined in terms similar to those 
in the Rio Declaration116 and is specified as an obligatory consideration in certain 
ministerial decision-making.117 Public participation is provided for in the forms of 
community consultation, input into assessment and approval of development 
                                                          
110  Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (2007) <http://www.environment.gov.au/ 
settlements/chemicals/pop.html>. 
111  Department of Health and Aging, About NICNAS (2008) <http://www.nicnas.gov.au/ 
About_NICNAS.asp>. 
112  Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Agricultural and Veterinary 
Chemicals (2008) <http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/regulation-safety/ag-
vet-chemicals>. 
113  Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority <http://www.apvma.gov.au/ 
index.asp>. 
114  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3. 
115  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3A; Rio 
Declaration above n 1. 
116  Rio Declaration above n 1, Principle 15: ‘Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ 
117  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 391; EPBC 
Act s 391. 
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actions, the monitoring of agreements and the preparation of management plans, 
recovery plans and threat abatement plans. In relation to the general international 
requirement of conduct of environmental impact assessments,118 the Act provides 
that the Commonwealth shall assess the potential impacts of development 
proposals on matters of national environmental significance. 119  Strategic 
assessments are also provided for.120  
The implementation of aspects of specified environmental treaties is also 
achieved through the EPBC Act. For example, matters of national environmental 
significance that may trigger the conduct of environmental impact assessments are 
defined in terms that implement some Commonwealth obligations under treaties 
including the CBD, CITES, Ramsar Convention, Bonn Convention, migratory 
birds conventions, UNCLOS and World Heritage Convention. 121  Similarly, 
categories of management arrangements for protected areas are identified in terms 
that implement conservation treaties, such as concerning world heritage and 
wetlands.122 In relation to implementation and enforcement more generally, the Act 
strengthened Commonwealth powers to enforce compliance. For example, 
compliance can be monitored and audited.123 More generally, an annual report is to 
be made on the operation of the Act124 and, every five years, a national State of the 
Environment Report produced.125 
The introduction into Parliament and passage of the EPBC Act revolutionised 
the relationship of international environmental law with Commonwealth 
environmental law and administration. 126  First, it advanced Australian 
implementation of the emergent international norms of sustainable development. 
Second, it improved Australian systems for implementation of several 
environmental treaties. Both were consonant with the government’s emphasis on 
compliance. Despite the permissive formulation of some environmental treaty 
obligations, such that they serve as ‘soft law’ that articulate environmental 
aspirations and function as policy education, the government’s emphasis upon 
compliance suggested a positivist approach to international environmental law 
obligations. 
                                                          
118  Rio Declaration, above n 1, Principle 17: ‘Environmental impact assessment, as a 
national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a 
significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a 
competent national authority.’ 
119  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3; EPBC Act 
pt 3. 
120  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 146; Gullett, 
above n 50, 142-47. 
121  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3. 
122  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 15. 
123  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 17. 
124  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 516. 
125  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 516A. 
126  See discussion above n 16. 
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IV. Conclusion 
At the outset, this paper proposed that the Howard government’s approaches to the 
field of international environmental law were primarily characterised by emphasis 
on sovereign rights, shared global responsibility, market forces and compliance. 
The review and analysis of the government’s practice across environmental and 
natural resources sectors indicates that these emphases were uneven. There is 
persuasive evidence for strong emphases on sovereign rights and on compliance 
but less evidence for commitment to shared global responsibility and the play of 
market forces. 
The emphasis on sovereign rights was apparent in some tough international 
policy and enforcement action, such as in the Antarctic extended continental shelf 
claim, where a policy to assert sovereign rights was acted upon even though 
sovereignty was at its most tenuous. Defence of sovereign rights was also clear in 
the government’s muscular new laws on illegal foreign fishing and its 
extraordinary fisheries enforcement efforts, especially in the sub-Antarctic. At 
times, its fishing enforcement action was undertaken despite tension with 
international legal constraints on pursuit and detention of foreign fishing vessels 
and crew. This assertiveness of sovereign rights and the national interest impact 
assessment of proposed treaty actions reflected the government’s predominantly 
realist perspective on international relations. Securing sovereign rights over 
Australia’s maritime frontiers and their marine resources, particularly to ensure 
their sustainable management, was a major priority of the Howard government.  
Indicators for the characteristic of internationally shared global responsibility 
for environmental management are evident but less clear. The government ratified 
many environmental treaties and amendments during its term that created global 
obligations for Australia, including for the conservation of albatross and petrels 
and for fisheries in the southern ocean. In relation to climate change, it 
demonstrated steadfastness in its demands for comparable shared responsibility for 
developing countries, even when it would have been diplomatically easier to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol that it was already implementing. However, in relation to 
Australia’s shared responsibility for the control of trade in genetically modified 
organisms, the government failed to ratify the Biosafety Protocol, which would 
commit Australia to export-control obligations complementary to impact 
assessment obligations for importing countries.  
The evidence for emphasis on the play of market forces is ambivalent. On the 
one hand, it was indicated by the government’s support for international 
private-sector initiatives, including geosequestration to combat climate change and 
simplification of the laws for trade in endangered species, as well as by its 
opposition to the Basel Convention ban. Within the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, it also fought against certain unilateral trade restrictive measures adopted for 
environmental purposes. On the other hand, the government failed to adopt 
measures to promote Australian participation in emerging carbon markets, even 
outside the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, and was willing to agree to 
multilateral controls on trade in hazardous chemicals and even to promote 
multilateral trade measures to conserve Patagonian Toothfish. Further, it adopted 
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unilateral Australian trade restrictive measures against trade in African elephant 
imports. An explanation of the marked inconsistencies might lie in a chronological 
analysis of policy shifts. In the mid-1990s, when the Howard government came to 
office, integration of trade policy with international environmental policy was in 
progress as a result of the 1989 merger of the Department of Foreign Affairs with 
the Department of Trade. That integration was initially characterised by a new 
bureaucratic opposition to trade restrictive environmental measures but that 
opposition moderated over time. However, closer analysis would be necessary to 
evaluate this explanation. 
Concerning domestic compliance, the Howard government’s commitment is 
certain. Its introduction of new Parliamentary processes contributed to transparency 
and accountability of the executive in its conduct of international law-making, in 
particular so as to ensure that it could meet its obligations. The reformulation of the 
Commonwealth framework for fundamental sustainable development laws 
included strengthened domestic enforcement and improved management systems. 
This was complemented by enhanced specific implementation of international 
obligations concerning biodiversity, wetlands and world heritage, supported by 
generous funding measures. Extending implementation to sea, marine parks 
became a prominent feature among Australian national parks. In addition, the 
government took international legal action to compel Japanese compliance in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, apparently expecting to be confirmed in a legally 
binding outcome. The government’s diligent concern with compliance suggested a 
positivist approach to the rule of international law. Nevertheless, compliance was a 
concern subordinated to effective protection of sovereign rights, as indicated by the 
questionable legality of some Australian practices in fisheries enforcement.  
Overall, there are no agreed criteria to evaluate the relative domestic and 
international ‘success’ of the Howard government’s approaches to international 
law in the field of environment. On the negative side of the ledger, the first 
environmental act of the incoming Rudd government was to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, signifying that the costs to Australia of the Howard government standing 
outside the international consensus were considered too high. On the positive side, 
the rule of international law in the field of environment was reinforced by a 
strengthened Australian domestic compliance infrastructure and the sub-Antarctic 
and Western Pacific region benefited from the formulation of new Australian-
driven international environmental norms. 

